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INTRODUCTION

Liability insurance touches the business, occupation or profession, and
personal life of almost everyone in the United States. Businesses are insured
under commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policies, cyber liability
policies, directors’ and officers’ (“D&O”) liability policies, employment
practices liability insurance policies, and excess or umbrella policies.
Professionals and the firms, groups, and institutions in which they practice
maintain errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurance coverage. Individuals receive
liability coverage under homeowners’ and personal auto policies. And this list is
by no means exhaustive.
Under most liability insurance policies, the insurance company has an
express contractual duty to (1) defend the insured in litigation and equivalent
proceedings;1 and (2) indemnify the insured against covered judgments up to the
policy’s liability limit. In some cases, the insurer’s implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing may obligate it to settle a claim or lawsuit against the insured for
an amount within its policy limits.2 Of these duties, the duty to defend is
commonly said to be the broadest.3 “The duty to defend hinges on the nature, not

1

See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01
04 13), at 1 (2012) (providing that the insurance company “will have the right and duty to defend
the insured against any ‘suit’” seeking covered damages) (on file with the author); Ins. Servs.
Office, Inc., Homeowners 3 – Special Form (HO 00 03 05 11), at 17 (2010) (stating that “[i]f a
claim is made or a suit is brought against an ‘insured’ for damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or
‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ to which [the policy] applies,” the insurer will
“[p]rovide a defense at [its] expense by counsel of [its] choice, even if the suit is groundless, false
or fraudulent”) (on file with the author). While a standard liability insurance policy obligates the
insurer to defend the insured against “suits” seeking covered damages and insurers routinely defend
insureds in civil litigation, courts have held various other actions to be “the functional equivalent
of a suit.” 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE
COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 4:1, at 4-4 to -5 (6th ed. 2013). These matters include administrative
proceedings and arbitrations. Id. § 4:1, at 4-5 n.4 (collecting cases).
2

The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing fundamentally requires that neither party to
a contract do anything to injure the other party’s right to receive the benefits of the agreement.
Burnett v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 389 P.3d 27, 31 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Jackson v. Am. Equity
Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 136, 142 (Alaska 2004)); Thornton v. Am. Interstate Ins. Co., 897 N.W.2d 445,
461 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa
1995)); Manu v. GEICO Cas. Co., 798 S.E.2d 598, 606 (Va. 2017).
3
See, e.g., Scout, L.L.C. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 434 P.3d 197, 202 (Idaho 2019) (describing an
insurer’s duty to defend as “much broader” than its duty to indemnify an insured); U-Haul Co. of
Mo. v. Carter, 567 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (“It is well-settled that an insurer’s duty
to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify.”); State ex rel. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson,
778 S.E.2d 677, 682 (W. Va. 2015) (“By contrast, an insurer’s duty to provide its insured a defense
is broader than the duty to indemnify.”); Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 922 N.W.2d 71,
79 (Wis. 2019) (“[T]he duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.”). Courts’ statements
that an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify should not be understood to
mean that a liability insurance policy’s coverage is broader with respect to the duty to defend than
it is with respect to the duty to indemnify. Both duties flow from the policy’s insuring agreement;
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the merits, of the plaintiff’s claim.”4 The duty to defend attaches where there is
merely the potential for coverage,5 that is, where the plaintiff’s claims or causes
of action allege facts that potentially obligate the insurer to indemnify the insured
if liability is ultimately established.6 For that matter, the duty to defend obligates
the insurer to defend the entire lawsuit if the plaintiff pleads even one potentially
covered claim or cause of action.7 In deciding whether an insurer owes a duty to
defend, courts resolve any ambiguities or doubts in favor of the insured.8
Broad though it may be, the insurer’s duty to defend is not limitless.
“The duty to defend does not attach where, as a matter of law, there is no basis
on which the insurer may be held liable for indemnification.”9 Perhaps more
simply stated, an insurer owes no duty to defend where there is no possibility of
coverage.10
An insurer must decide whether it has a duty to defend its insured at the
outset of the litigation.11 The insurer must make that decision within a reasonable

their differences are attributable to their conditions. The duty to indemnify exists as soon as the
contract is formed, but it is not triggered until the insured’s liability is established. The duty to
defend is not similarly conditioned: it exists as soon as a claim potentially within coverage is made,
regardless of whether the insured is ultimately held liable. Because the duty to indemnify is
conditioned on the insured’s liability and the duty to defend is not, the duty to defend is implicated
in more cases; however, this does not alter the essential relationship between the insurer’s duty to
defend and coverage under the policy. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 692–93 (6th ed. 2018).
4
Great Lakes Beverages, L.L.C. v. Wochinski, 892 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Wis. Ct. App. 2017).
5
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Mktg., L.L.C., 353 P.3d 319, 325 (Cal. 2015); Harlor v. Amica
Mut. Ins. Co., 150 A.3d 793, 799 (Me. 2016) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d
220, 226 (Me. 1980)); Kruger-Willis v. Hoffenburg, 393 P.3d 844, 848 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
6
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 696.
7
Teufel v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 419 P.3d 546, 549 (Ariz. 2018); Mount Vernon Fire
Ins. Co. v. Visionaid, Inc., 76 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Mass. 2017); Steadfast Ins. Co., 922 N.W.2d at
79.
8
Clarke Co., Ltd. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 914 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying
Iowa law); Travelers Prop. & Cas. Co. of Am. v. Actavis, Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5, 15 (Ct. App.
2017); Am. Access Cas. Co. v. Novit, 105 N.E.3d 839, 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018); Todd v. Vt. Mut.
Ins. Co., 137 A.3d 1115, 1120 (N.H. 2016); Grigg v. Aarrowcast, Inc., 909 N.W.2d 183, 191 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2018).
9

Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.S.3d 468, 469 (App. Div. 2018).
Mau v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 388, 390–91 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Schultze v.
Cont’l Ins. Co., 619 N.W.2d 510, 513 (N.D. 2000)); All Green Elec., Inc. v. Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co.,
231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 454 (Ct. App. 2018); Spencer v. Hartford Cas., 556 S.W.3d 679, 683 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2018).
11
See Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 541–42 (Pa. 2010)
(“[W]hether a complaint raises a claim against an insured that is potentially covered is a question
to be answered by the insurer in the first instance . . . . Although the question of whether the claim
is covered (and therefore triggers the insurer’s duty to defend) may be difficult, it is the insurer’s
duty to make that decision.”).
10
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time after the insured requests a defense.12 Depending on the jurisdiction, the
insurer will decide whether to defend the insured based either on the facts alleged
in the plaintiff’s complaint or petition, or on a combination of the facts alleged
in the plaintiff’s complaint or petition and any extrinsic evidence that indicates
the potential for coverage.13 If coverage is clear, the insurer will accept the
insured’s defense and, ultimately, indemnify the insured up to the liability limits
of its policy if necessary. If the insurer’s analysis of the facts presented at the
outset of the litigation suggests that it may have a duty to indemnify the insured
but that its duty to do so is uncertain, the insurer typically will defend the insured
under a reservation of rights.14 Finally, it may be that the insurer will be unable
to ascertain any possible basis for coverage and consequently decline to defend
the insured. If, in this final scenario, the insurer is for some reason wrong about
the potential for coverage, it will have breached its duty to defend the insured.15
Then, like any party that breaches a contract, it will potentially be liable for the
insured’s damages caused by the breach.16 But what are those damages? If the

12
See Rushforth Constr. Co. v. Wesco Ins. Co., No. C17-1063-JCC, 2018 WL 1610222, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 2018) (“An insurer may breach its duty to defend by failing to respond to an
insured’s tender in a reasonably timely manner.”).

There are two approaches to determining an insurer’s duty to defend. Under the “four
corners” or “eight corners” approach, the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint or petition
are compared with the policy, and the insurer owes a defense only if those allegations potentially
implicate the insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured. Lupu v. Loan City, L.L.C., 903 F.3d 382,
389–92 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying Pennsylvania law); GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist
Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Tex. 2006). Under this approach, facts outside the pleadings are not
material to the determination of the insurer’s duty to defend. Lupu, 903 F.3d at 390–91; GuideOne,
197 S.W.3d at 307. In contrast, courts employing an “extrinsic evidence” approach hold that an
insurer must look beyond the pleadings and consider any facts brought to its attention or any facts
that it reasonably could discover in determining whether it has a duty to defend. See, e.g., Att’y’s
Liab. Prot. Soc’y, Inc. v. Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C., 370 P.3d 1101, 1111–12 (Alaska 2016)
(“[T]he duty to defend attaches, if at all, on the basis of the complaint and known or reasonably
ascertainable facts at the time of the complaint.” (footnote omitted)); Allen v. Bryers, 512 S.W.3d
17, 31 (Mo. 2016) (“The duty to defend is determined by comparing the insurance policy language
with facts: ‘(1) alleged in the petition; (2) the insurer knows at the outset of the case; or (3) that are
reasonably apparent to the insurer at the outset of the case.’” (quoting Allen v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co.,
436 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Mo. 2014))). For courts following the extrinsic evidence approach, the
allegations in the plaintiff’s petition or complaint are merely the starting point in analyzing the
insurer’s duty to defend.
14
See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 705–07 (explaining reservations of rights).
13

On the other hand, if the insurer’s coverage determination is correct, then there is no breach
of the duty to defend. Blake v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 904 A.2d 1071, 1076 (Vt. 2006).
15

16

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST. 2005); see generally Colin
Quinn & Brendan Quinn, Awarding Damages for a Breach of Contract: Direct or Consequential?,
J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Oct. 2017, at 20, 21 (“While numerous types of damages can result from a breach
[of contract], they are generally classified into two categories. The first category, direct damages,
are those which flow directly from the breach itself. The second category, consequential damages,
refer to the economic harm that is beyond the immediate scope of the contract.”).
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insurer breaches its duty to defend and the insured enters into a settlement in
which it consents to a judgment in excess of the policy limits,17 surrenders a
default judgment in excess of the policy limits, or tries the case with its own
lawyers and suffers a judgment in excess of the policy limits, do the insured’s
consequential damages recoverable for the breach include the full amount of the
excess judgment? In other words, does an insurance company’s simple breach of
its duty to defend expose it to extracontractual liability?
The question of whether an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend should
expose it to extracontractual liability is an enormously important one from a
financial standpoint. The sums at stake in cases in which the insurer allegedly
breached its duty to defend tend to be substantial. Unfortunately, courts do
answer the question consistently or—all too often—even correctly. The question
was answered most recently by the Nevada Supreme Court in its December 2018
decision in Century Surety Co. v. Andrew,18 in which the court held that “even in
the absence of bad faith, the insurer may be liable for a judgment that exceeds
the policy limits if the judgment is consequential to the insurer’s breach.”19
Under the Andrew approach, an insurer that declines to defend its insured
assumes the risk of extracontractual liability.20 As the Andrew court succinctly
summarized matters, an insurer “refuses to defend at its peril.”21 Other courts
have made similarly grim statements about the possible consequences of an
insurer’s innocent misjudgment of its duty to defend.22
Commentators immediately heralded the Andrew decision as a “potent
weapon” and “powerful tool” for insureds.23 Some policyholder lawyers
17
For explanations of consent judgments, see Douglas R. Richmond, Consent Judgments and
the Taint of Bad Faith, Fraud, and Collusion, NEW APPLEMAN CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INS.
LAW, Winter 2018, at 1, 1–2; Jill B. Berkeley & Seth D. Lamden, To the Policy Limits and Beyond,
THE BRIEF, Spring 2018, at 37, 42–43; Jeffrey N. Labovitch & Cody S. Moon, What Insurers and
Their Counsel Should Know About Consent Judgments, FOR DEF., May 2015, at 34–37; Douglas
R. Richmond, The Consent Judgment Quandary of Insurance Law, 48 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC.
L.J. 538, 541–45 (2013).
18
432 P.3d 180 (Nev. 2018).
19
20
21

Id. at 186.
See id. (quoting Hamlin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 86 F.3d 93, 94 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Id.
See, e.g., Tidyman’s Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. Davis (Tidyman’s I), 330 P.3d 1139, 1149 (Mont.
2014) (“In other words, where an insurer refuses to defend its insured, it does so at its peril.”);
Dove v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 399 P.3d 400, 405 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (“[A]n insurer who
refuses to defend . . . without seeking a judicial determination that the alleged insured is not covered
under the policy or without a voluntary waiver from the insured does so at its peril.” (citations
omitted)).
23
Jeff Sistrunk, Nev. Defense Breach Ruling to Tee Up Damages Battles, LAW360 (Dec. 18,
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1112641/nev-defense-breach-ruling-to-tee-up-damagesbattles (saying that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Andrew “gave policyholders a potent
weapon”); Payne & Fears, Victory for Policyholders—An Insurer’s Breach of the Duty to Defend
Opens Up Policy Limits, JD SUPRA (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/victory22
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apparently emboldened by Andrew even appeared to go so far as to suggest that
lawyers representing insureds should scheme at the outset of a case either to
induce the insurer to breach its duty to defend or to maximize the insured’s
damages in the event of a breach.24
Although the Andrew court admirably qualified its holding by stating
that an insured seeking to hold an insurer liable for an excess judgment must
prove that the insurer’s breach of its duty to defend caused the excess judgment
and that she took all reasonable means to protect herself and mitigate her
damages,25 the court nevertheless erred. With rare exception, an insurer’s simple
breach of the duty to defend should not expose it to extracontractual liability. To
the contrary, the insured’s damages should be capped at the policy limits plus the
insured’s defense costs, if any. Extracontractual liability for breach of the duty
to defend should require an act of bad faith by the insurer or some other
extraordinary circumstance. Indeed, that is the majority rule,26 although courts
all too often hold that an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend makes it liable for
the full amount of any subsequent judgment under basic contract damages
theory, and courts in a number of states have yet to consider insurers’ possible
extracontractual liability for breach of the duty to defend.27 This Article explains
the minority rule’s infirmities and the correctness of the majority rule in the hope
that courts that have not adopted the majority rule will do so when presented with
the opportunity, and that those that follow the minority rule will reconsider their
positions.
Looking ahead, Part II discusses the minority approach, under which an
insurer’s mistaken breach of its duty to defend may expose it to extracontractual
liability; bad faith is not required for the insurer to be liable beyond its policy
limits. It begins by explaining the many serious flaws in the minority approach.
After doing so, it examines the Andrew case in detail. In addition to being the

for-policyholders-an-insurer-s-53492/ (describing the Andrew decision as “another powerful tool
that a policyholder may use to combat insurance companies”).
24
See Payne & Fears, supra note 23 (“Careful planning by a policyholder and insurance
counsel from the outset of a case can dramatically increase the insurance company’s potential
liabilities, opening up the door for earlier settlements and better results.”).
25
Andrew, 432 P.3d at 186 (quoting Thomas v. W. World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1303
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
26
Id. at 184 (quoting Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958)).
27
In an amicus curiae brief filed with the Nevada Supreme Court in Andrew, the Federation
of Defense & Corporate Counsel asserted that ten states had direct precedent capping an insurer’s
liability at its policy limits, cases in four states suggested that those states would adopt the policy
limits rule, federal courts interpreting or predicting the law of three additional states had adopted
or supported the policy limits rule, courts in eight states allowed extracontractual liability, and 25
states had not addressed the question. Brief for the Fed’n of Defense & Corp. Counsel as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant, at *2–20, Century Sur. Co. v. Andrew, 432 P.3d 180 (Nev. 2018)
(Case No. 73756), 2017 WL 9940103.
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most recent state supreme court case to follow the minority approach, Andrew
illustrates some of the problems with that approach.
Part III then discusses the majority approach, which, again, holds that an
insurer’s simple breach of the duty to defend does not create excess liability;
rather, the insurer’s damages top out at the policy limits plus the insured’s
defense costs, if any. In examining the majority approach, Part III dives deeply
into its exceptions. As this Part explains, an insurer may suffer extracontractual
liability for breaching its duty to defend if the breach is coupled with an
unreasonable refusal to settle the claim or lawsuit against the insured within
policy limits or the breach rises to the level of bad faith based on a test that tracks
the two-part test commonly used for first-party bad faith. Furthermore, an insurer
may face extracontractual liability if it leads an insured to believe that it will
provide a defense but ultimately does not, and the insured’s detrimental reliance
on the insurer’s promise to defend results in a default judgment that exceeds
policy limits. Finally, some scholars have asserted that another possible
exception to the general rule that an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend should
not produce extracontractual liability may be found where the insured is unable
to afford a lawyer and suffers a default judgment that exceeds policy limits as a
result. This final exception, however, is arguable.
II. THE MINORITY RULE ALLOWING EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. The Minority Rule Misapprehends Contract Damages in Insurance Law
Again, various courts have held or stated that an insurer that breaches its
duty to defend is liable for the full amount of any subsequent judgment—
including amounts in excess of the policy limits.28 These courts reason that an

28
See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he general rule under Massachusetts law is that if the insurer fails to defend the lawsuit, it is
liable for all defense costs and (assuming policy coverage) the entire resulting judgment or
settlement, unless liability can be allocated among covered and uncovered claims.”); Newman v.
United Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (D. Mont. 2014) (“Under both Utah and
Montana law, the consequence of an insurer’s failure to defend are the same: the insurer is
responsible for any judgments entered below.”); McGrath v. Everest Nat’l Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp.
2d 1085, 1107–09 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (applying Indiana law); Sauer v. Home Indem. Co., 841 P.2d
176, 184 (Alaska 1992) (“[A]n insurance company which wrongfully refuses to defend is liable
for the judgment which ensues even though the facts may ultimately demonstrate that no indemnity
is due.”); Atlanta Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gardenhire, 545 S.E.2d 182, 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]here
an insurance company fails to offer a defense, it may be liable to its insured beyond the policy
limits to the full amount of the judgment.”); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Vance, 730 S.W.2d 521, 523
(Ky. 1987) (“[I]f the insurer has elected not to provide a defense wrongfully or erroneously because
it is later determined that the policy provided coverage, the insurer then would have breached the
terms of its policy and the aggrieved party then would be entitled to recover all damages naturally
flowing from the breach irrespective of policy limits.”); Tidyman’s I, 330 P.3d 1139, 1150 (Mont.
2014) (“[A]n insurer who breaches the duty to defend is liable for the full amount of the judgment,
including amounts in excess of policy limits.”); Andrew, 432 P.3d at 182 (“We conclude that an
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insurer’s breach of its duty to defend entitles the insured to “recover all damages
naturally flowing from the breach,” which include a judgment that exceeds the
breaching insurer’s policy limits.29 This is said to be a fundamental breach of
contract damages analysis.30
In fact, an insurer’s alleged extracontractual liability does not flow
naturally from a simple breach of the duty to defend. This is first because any
lawyer the insured hires to defend it will presumably provide the same quality of
representation as the lawyer the insurer would have appointed to defend the
insured had the insurer properly accepted the defense.31 Accordingly, the amount
of any judgment against the insured should be the same or nearly so, regardless
of who provided the insured’s defense.32 Alternatively, the plaintiff’s case
against the insured may be so strong that even a vigorous defense provided by
the insurer would not have defeated liability or held the insured’s damages within
policy limits.33 If so, the insurer’s acceptance of the defense would not have
insurer’s liability where it breaches its contractual duty to defend is not capped at the policy limits
plus the insured’s defense costs, and instead, an insurer may be liable for any consequential
damages caused by its breach. We further conclude that good-faith determinations are irrelevant
for determining damages upon a breach of this duty.”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Imbesi, 826
A.2d 735, 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (quoting Griggs v. Bertram, 443 A.2d 163, 171–
72 (N.J. 1982)); Bruce-Terminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 574, 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 176 S.E.2d 751, 754 (N.C. 1970));
Blake v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 904 A.2d 1071, 1076 (Vt. 2006) (stating that an insurer that wrongly
denies coverage based on an exclusion “will be liable for a judgment in a case in which it did not
participate” (citing Vance, 730 S.W.2d at 522)); Water Wells Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. Ins.
Co., 881 N.W.2d 285, 297 (Wis. 2016) (“By declining to defend an insured, an insurer opens itself
up to a myriad of adverse consequences if its . . . determination turns out to be wrong. For example,
an insurer that breaches its duty to defend is liable for all costs naturally flowing from the
breach. This liability is not limited to policy limits . . . .” (citations omitted)).
29
Vance, 730 S.W.2d at 523; see Se. Wis. Prof’l Baseball Park Dist. v. Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus. Am., Inc., 738 N.W.2d 87, 108 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (using nearly identical language).
30
See, e.g., Ayers v. C & D Gen. Contractors, 269 F. Supp. 2d 911, 914 (W.D. Ky. 2003)
(discussing Kentucky law).
31
See, e.g., Brockmann v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 404 F. App’x 271, 286 (10th Cir. 2010)
(observing that because the county was represented by competent counsel—an assistant county
attorney—in lieu of a defense lawyer appointed by the insurer, the insurer’s refusal to defend was
not a factor in the excess judgment); Snodgrass v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 1012,
1022 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (“Although State Farm refused to represent [its insured] Owen, he was
represented by competent counsel in a case in which Owen’s liability was clear and [the underlying
plaintiff’s] injuries were extensive, and there was no offer to settle within State Farm’s policy
limits. . . . [T]here is no basis to conclude that judgment would have been for a lesser sum if State
Farm had defended Owen.”); Burgraff v. Menard, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 596, 609 (Wis. 2016)
(“Menard cannot demonstrate that the amount of the jury verdict was a result of the breach. Menard
chose its own counsel and there is no assertion that it would have achieved a better result at trial
had [the insurer] chosen Menard’s counsel.”).
32
Snodgrass, 804 P.2d at 1022.
33
See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[The
insured’s] liability was too clear for argument; counsel could not have hoped to defeat [the
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altered the outcome.34 Either way, no one can reasonably argue that the insurer’s
breach of its duty to defend the insured caused any excess judgment; in other
words, any excess judgment did not naturally flow from the breach.35
The same is true if the insured settles the case for an amount exceeding
the policy limits after the insurer breaches the duty to defend. The settlement
should reflect the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s claim; this settlement value
should not depend upon or be increased by the insurer’s breach of its duty to
defend.36 Likewise, if the insured enters into a consent judgment as part of a
settlement after the insurer breaches its duty to defend, the amount of that
judgment must be reasonable.37 The test for whether a consent judgment is
reasonable is what a reasonable and prudent person in the insured’s shoes would
have paid to settle the plaintiff’s claims.38 Assuming the consent judgment to be
reasonable in amount and untainted by bad faith, fraud, or collusion on the
insured’s part, it should not exceed the amount of any settlement that would have
been achieved had the insurer defended the insured.

plaintiff’s] suit. There was no difference between what counsel could have achieved and what
actually happened (a default judgment when [the insured] did not defend herself).”).
34

Id. at 486–87.
See generally 1 WINDT, supra note 1, § 4:36, at 4-290 (“In most . . . cases, there is no basis
for concluding that a judgment would have been for a lesser amount had the defense been
conducted by counsel provided by the insurer. As a result, it cannot be said that the detriment
suffered by the insured as a result of a judgment in excess of the policy limits was proximately
caused by the insurer’s refusal to defend.” (footnote omitted)).
35

36
See Hamlin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 86 F.3d 93, 95 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving a
case in which the insurer refused to pay for counsel for the insured, the insured hired its own
counsel, and the case settled; there was no evidence that a better settlement might have been
achieved with insurer-provided counsel, especially since the plaintiff’s claims against the insured
appeared to be “entirely valid”); Conway v. Country Cas. Ins. Co., 442 N.E.2d 245, 249 (Ill. 1982)
(“The $10,000 paid by Conway to [the plaintiff] cannot be said to have been proximately caused
by Country Casualty’s breach [of the duty to defend] absent a showing that there could have been
a settlement for a lesser amount if Country Casualty had defended the action. . . . There was no
such showing . . . and it will be assumed that Conway would have been required to pay . . . $10,000
even had Country Casualty defended the . . . action against him.” (citation omitted)).
37
Jimenez v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 651 F. App’x 850, 853 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying Florida
law); Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tracy’s Treasures, Inc., 19 N.E.3d 1100, 1112 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)
(citing Guillen v. Potomac Ins. Co., 785 N.E.2d 1, 14–15 (Ill. 2003)); Abbey/Land L.L.C. v.
Interstate Mech., Inc., 345 P.3d 1032, 1034 (Mont. 2015); Forsman v. Blues, Brews & Bar-BQues, Inc., 903 N.W.2d 524, 529 (N.D. 2017) (quoting Medd v. Fonder, 543 N.W.2d 483, 485
(N.D. 1996)); W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. TSP, Inc., 904 N.W.2d 52, 56 n.1 (S.D. 2017).

Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Hempel, 4 F. App’x 703, 717 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying New Mexico
law); Waddell v. Titan Ins. Co., 88 P.3d 1141, 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting United Servs.
Auto. Ass’n v. Morris, 741 P.2d 246, 254 (Ariz. 1987)); Guillen, 785 N.E.2d at 14 (quoting Miller
v. Shughart, 316 N.W.2d 729, 735 (Minn. 1982)); Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524,
535 (Iowa 1995); Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Perry, 692 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Me. 1997);
Jorgensen v. Knutson, 662 N.W.2d 893, 904 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Miller, 316 N.W.2d at 735).
38
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Finally, along these lines, an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend
cannot be said to have proximately caused an insured’s excess liability in a case
in which the plaintiff was unwilling to settle within policy limits,39 or in which
the plaintiff simply made no offer to settle within policy limits.40 In such a case,
the plaintiff cannot show that the insurer’s defense of the insured would have
prevented an excess judgment.41
It is also possible to conclude that an insurer’s mistaken breach of the
duty to defend should not result in extracontractual liability by essentially reverse
engineering an insurer’s performance of its duty in a representative case. To
explain, consider that an insurer that defends its insured in a case of clear
coverage, declines the plaintiff’s offer to settle within policy limits, and takes the
case to trial and loses an excess verdict is not necessarily liable for the portion of
the judgment that exceeds its policy limits.42 For the insurance company to face
extracontractual liability in that scenario, its decision not to settle within policy
limits, despite the opportunity to do so, must rise to the level of bad faith as
defined in the jurisdiction.43 In other words, where an insurer fully performs its

39

See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 177 F.3d 326, 336–38 (5th Cir. 1999)
(applying Mississippi law).
40
41

George R. Winchell, Inc. v. Norris, 633 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (en banc).
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.3d at 337; George R. Winchell, Inc., 633 P.2d at 1177–78.

42
See, e.g., Surgery Ctr. at 900 N. Mich. Ave., L.L.C. v. Am. Physicians Assurance Corp.,
922 F.3d 778, 784–87 (7th Cir. 2019) (applying Illinois law in a case that the insurer, the defense
counsel, and the insured’s president considered defensible); Christian Builders, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1230–40 (D. Minn. 2007) (applying Minnesota law); Johnson v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 88, 90–91 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Ferris v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas.
Co., 122 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Iowa 1963)); Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 97 N.W.2d 168, 173
(Iowa 1959); Eskind v. Marcel, 951 So. 2d 289, 293 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“A liability insurer, in
the absence of bad faith, is generally free to settle or to litigate at its own discretion, without liability
to its insured for a judgment in excess of the policy limits.”); Silva v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 75 N.E.3d 1132, 1135–39 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017) (reasoning that because a legitimate
difference of opinion existed as to the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries and there was ample evidence
to suggest that the plaintiff was not injured nearly as badly as he claimed to be, the insurer’s failure
to make settlement offer within its $250,000 policy limit prior to $818,000 verdict for the plaintiff
was not unfair claim settlement practice).
43

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 732–34, 738–39. For an insurer to be found liable for
bad faith for not settling within policy limits in some jurisdictions, a plaintiff must establish that
the insurer engaged in dishonest, malicious, or oppressive conduct carried out with a state of mind
characterized by hatred, ill will, or revenge to avoid an obligation to the insured. See, e.g., Sims v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 894 F.3d 941, 945 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Ark. 1984)); Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Edwards, 210 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Ark. 2005); see Missler v. State Farm Ins. Co., 41 N.E.3d 297, 302
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that liability for bad faith requires evidence of a state of mind
reflecting dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, furtive design, or ill will (quoting Mahan v. Am.
Standard Ins. Co., 862 N.E.2d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007))). Other jurisdictions are less stringent
and hold only that an insured must “show more than just negligence” by the insurer to prevail on
a bad faith claim. Purscell v. Tico Ins. Co., 790 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying Missouri
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duty to defend and is not guilty of bad faith, its liability is capped at its policy
limits even though the insured’s damages exceed the policy limits.44 That being
so, the insurer’s mistaken breach of its duty to defend should not expose it to
extracontractual liability. Rather, extracontractual liability—if any—must result
from the insurer’s unreasonable failure to settle the third party’s lawsuit against
the insured within policy limits and not from the insurer’s breach of its duty to
defend.45
What this reverse engineering exercise illustrates, of course, is the key
contract law principle that damages for breach are intended to restore the injured
party, as near as may be, to the position it would have enjoyed had the breaching
party instead performed its obligations.46 The injured party is not entitled to be
placed in a better position than it would have occupied had there been no
breach.47 The non-breaching party is not entitled to receive a windfall.48 In our
context, awarding an insured extracontractual damages for a liability insurer’s
simple breach of the duty to defend puts the insured in a better position than it
would have occupied had there been no breach. After all, had the insurer
defended the insured and legitimately declined to settle the case within policy
limits in favor of going to trial, the insured—not the insurer—would be
responsible for paying that portion of any judgment that exceeded the policy’s
liability limits. The minority position thus grants the insured a windfall.

law). Still, in other jurisdictions, an insurer may be exposed to extracontractual liability if it acted
negligently in settling a claim or suit against its insured. See, e.g., Associated Wholesale Grocers,
Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 89 (Kan. 1997) (discussing a liability insurer’s duty to act
“in good faith and without negligence” in settlement).
44
See, e.g., Christian Builders, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 1230–40 (finding no bad faith in a case the
insurer vigorously defended and thus capping the insurer’s liability at its policy limits).
45
See generally Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (“It
is now beyond dispute . . . that where the company does assume the defense of a suit against its
insured it may be liable over and above its policy limits if it acts in bad faith, or in some
jurisdictions acts negligently, in refusing to settle the claim against its insured within its policy
limits. . . . Conversely, where the company in good faith believes there is a valid defense to the
claim, even though the defense proves unsuccessful and results in a judgment against the insured
above the policy limits, the company is not liable, because of such honest mistake, beyond the
limits of its policy.” (citations omitted)).
46

Legacy Data Access, Inc. v. Cadrillion, L.L.C., 889 F.3d 158, 168 (4th Cir. 2018) (applying
North Carolina law); Brookewood, Ltd. v. DeQueen Physical Therapy & Occupational Therapy,
Inc., 547 S.W.3d 461, 467 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018); WSC/2005 L.L.C. v. Trio Venture Assocs., 190
A.3d 255, 268 (Md. 2018); Cain v. Price, 415 P.3d 25, 30 (Nev. 2018).
47
IBM Corp. v. State ex rel. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 112 N.E.3d 1088, 1105 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2018); G4S Tech. L.L.C. v. Mass. Tech. Park Corp., 99 N.E.3d 728, 735 (Mass. 2018)
(quoting Ficara v. Belleau, 117 N.E.2d 287, 289 (Mass. 1954)).
48
Legacy Builders, L.L.C. v. Andrews, 335 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Wyo. 2014).
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B. The Minority Rule in Action: The Andrew Case
As noted earlier, Andrew is the latest state supreme court case to have
adopted the minority rule regarding the extracontractual consequences of breach
of the duty to defend, and the decision was anxiously awaited in insurance law
circles. The decision in Andrew is worth examining both because the court
deviated from the majority rule and because the court was careful to qualify the
minority rule by holding that the insured must prove that the insurer’s breach of
its duty to defend caused an excess judgment.49 The Andrew court further
softened the minority rule when it stated that the insured must “‘take all
reasonable means to protect himself and mitigate his damages’” caused by the
insurer’s breach.50
1. Background and Facts
Andrew arose out of a personal injury action. In January 2009, Ryan
Pretner was riding his bicycle in Las Vegas, Nevada, when he was struck in the
head by the side-view mirror of a pickup truck driven by Michael Vasquez.51
Pretner suffered a catastrophic brain injury in the accident.52
Vasquez was insured under a personal auto policy issued by Progressive
Insurance and a commercial liability policy issued to his business, Blue Streak
Auto Detailing (“Blue Streak”), by Century Surety Co.53 Following the accident,
Vasquez told the police that he had just gotten off work and was en route from
his house to his uncle’s home when he struck Pretner.54 He also signed an
affidavit to that effect.55 Vasquez gave a recorded statement to Progressive in
which he said that he was off work and running errands at the time of the
accident.56 He did not report the accident to Century until March 2009 “because
he felt that the accident did not occur while he was driving on Blue Streak
business.”57 When he finally did speak with a Century adjuster, he reiterated that
he was not on Blue Streak business at the time of the accident.58

49

Century Sur. Co. v. Andrew, 432 P.3d 180, 186 (Nev. 2018).
Id. (quoting Thomas v. W. World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977)).
51
Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00978-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 5592889, at *1 (D.
Nev. Oct. 10, 2013).
52
Id.
50

53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In May 2009, Pretner and his legal guardian, Dana Andrew, made a
policy limits settlement demand on Century.59 Approximately one month later,
Century denied coverage to Vasquez and Blue Streak because Vasquez was not
acting in the course and scope of Blue Streak business at the time of the
accident.60 Century also rejected the plaintiffs’ settlement demand based on the
absence of coverage.61
In January 2011, Pretner and Andrew sued Vasquez and Blue Streak in
Nevada state court.62 They alleged in their complaint that Vasquez was Blue
Streak’s agent and employee, and that he was acting in the course and scope of
his employment when he negligently struck Pretner with his truck.63 Century
again denied coverage based on Vasquez’s many post-accident statements that
he was not on Blue Streak business at the time of the accident.64 Because it denied
coverage for the accident, Century also declined to defend the lawsuit against
Vasquez and Blue Streak.65
Century’s denial of a defense based on facts extrinsic to the plaintiffs’
complaint rather than defending Vasquez and Blue Streak under a reservation of
rights based on the facts alleged in the complaint would prove to be fateful. As
subsequent events would amply demonstrate, Century apparently overlooked
[t]he general rule . . . that insurers may not use facts outside the
complaint as the basis for refusing to defend, with the result that
even an insurer with a strong factual basis for contesting
coverage must defend under a reservation of rights and then file
a declaratory-judgment action to terminate the duty to defend.66
Anyway, neither Blue Streak nor Vasquez answered the lawsuit and the
plaintiffs took defaults against them.67 Vasquez and Blue Streak subsequently
entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs under which Progressive
paid the plaintiffs its $100,000 policy limit, the plaintiffs agreed to limit
execution on any judgment against Vasquez and Blue Streak to insurance
proceeds, and Vasquez and Blue Streak assigned their rights against Century to
the plaintiffs.68

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1253 (D. Nev. 2015).
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 13 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
Andrew, 2013 WL 5592889, at *2.
Id.
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In February 2012, the plaintiffs applied for a default judgment of just
under $12.5 million in compensatory damages, and in their application recited
that Vasquez was in the course and scope of his employment with Blue Streak
when his truck struck Pretner.69 No one opposed the application for a default
judgment.70 The state court heard the application in April 2012 and, again, there
was no opposition.71 The state court thus entered a default judgment against Blue
Streak and Vasquez which recited that Vasquez was Blue Streak’s agent and
employee, that he was acting in the course and scope of his employment when
he negligently caused the accident, and that Blue Streak was therefore liable for
Pretner’s injuries.72 The court awarded the plaintiffs slightly more than $18
million in damages, including attorney’s fees.73
In April 2012, the plaintiffs sued Century in Nevada state court for bad
faith and breach of contract.74 In June 2012, Century removed the case to federal
court.75
2. The Federal Court Action
In the federal case, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, which the district court denied.76 Both sides asked the district court to
reconsider that order, which it did.77 A key question on reconsideration was
whether Century had breached its duty to defend and, if so, what the measure of
any damages might be.78
The district court concluded that Century had breached its duty to defend
because the plaintiffs’ complaint in the state court action alleged that Vasquez
was acting in the course and scope of his employment with Blue Streak when he
injured Pretner.79 Thus, there had at least been a potential for coverage under the
policy.80
With respect to damages, the plaintiffs argued that “when an insurer
breaches the duty to defend, the appropriate finding is liability against the insurer

69

Id.

70

Id.
Id.

71
72
73
74
75

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.

76

Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00978-APG-PAL, 2014 WL 1764740, at *1 (D.
Nev. Apr. 29, 2014).
77
78
79
80

Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6.
Id.
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for the full amount of the resulting judgment, even if it exceeds the policy
limits.”81 The district court weighed Nevada authority on contract damages,
surveyed case law from other states, and concluded that in circumstances such
as these, “the Nevada Supreme Court would not allow for extra-contractual
damages if the insurer did not act in bad faith.”82 Here, there was no evidence of
bad faith by Century.83 “To the contrary, its investigation revealed that the
accident likely was not a covered event.”84 As the court noted, in denying
coverage, Century reasonably relied on Vasquez’s many unequivocal statements
that he was not on Blue Streak business at the time of the accident.85
“Absent bad faith,” the court explained, “the breach of the duty to defend
results in typical contractual damages.”86 The court therefore concluded that the
plaintiffs could recover “the damages incurred as a result of Century’s breach of
its duty to defend that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the contract,
but those damages [were] capped by the $1 million limit” of the Century policy.87
The determination of the plaintiffs’ actual damages would require a trial.88
Then, in September 2015, the district court reconsidered its ruling that
Century’s liability for breach of its duty to defend was capped at its $1 million
policy limit.89 In a stunning display of indecisiveness, the court pivoted 180
degrees and decided “that the default judgment was a reasonably foreseeable
consequential damage caused by Century’s breach of its duty to defend its
insured.”90
The court observed that under Nevada law, compensatory damages for a
breach of contract include expectancy damages.91 Here, Blue Streak’s
expectancy damages included the cost of defense plus payment of the Century
policy limits up to $1 million.92 Furthermore, Blue Streak was due consequential
damages caused by Century’s breach of the duty to defend.93 Consequential
damages are those that “‘aris[e] naturally, or were reasonably contemplated by
both parties at the time they made the contract.’”94 As the court viewed matters,
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at *9.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1252 (D. Nev. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 1254.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
Id. at 1255 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
Id. (quoting Hornwood v. Smith’s Food King No. 1, 772 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Nev. 1989)).
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“[w]hen the insurer breaches the duty to defend, a default judgment is a
reasonably foreseeable result because, in the ordinary course, when an insurer
refuses to defend its insured, a probable result is that the insured will default.”95
Century need not have acted in bad faith to incur extracontractual liability
because:
One explanation of the reasoning behind th[e] rule [that bad faith
is required for extracontractual damages for breach of the duty
to defend] is that “the measure of damages for the breach of a
contract for the payment of money is the amount agreed to be
paid with interest,” and a breach of the duty to defend “cannot
be held to enlarge the limitation as to the amount fixed as
reimbursement for injuries to persons.” This explanation does
not address consequential damages resulting from the breach of
the duty to defend. The duty to defend is not based on the
contractual promise to pay a certain amount of money to an
injured person. Instead, it is a promise to provide a defense, the
breach of which may result in consequential damages to the
insured beyond the policy limits. Mannheimer’s reasoning
makes sense in terms of the duty to indemnify because absent
bad faith, the parties would expect the insurer to pay only the
policy limits on indemnification. But it does not explain why a
breach of the duty to defend should be subject to the policy’s
indemnification limit, which is a separate duty with separate
remedies for its breach.96
For obvious reasons, genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether
the settlement agreement and default judgment were fraudulent or collusive,97
and thus whether Century was bound thereby.98 Those issues would have to await
a jury trial.99

95

Id.

96

Id. at 1256 (quoting Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 N.W. 189, 191
(Minn. 1921)).
97
Before settling, Vasquez steadfastly insisted that he was not working for Blue Streak at the
time of the accident. Id. at 1268. Progressive never defended Vasquez despite his insistence that
Pretner bore fault for the accident; Progressive provided him a lawyer only to advise him
concerning the settlement agreement. Id. at 1268–69. Vasquez initially did not want to sign the
settlement agreement “because he maintained his position that he was not at work at the time of
the accident and therefore Century should not be liable.” Id. at 1269. Nevertheless, he agreed to a
default in exchange for a promise to limit execution on the judgment to the Century policy. Id. “A
reasonable jury could find that agreement set the stage for Pretner’s counsel to obtain a default
judgment that manufactured coverage even though there was no evidence supporting coverage
under the Century policy.” Id.
98
99

Id. at 1270.
Id.
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Before the case could be tried, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit certified the following question to the Nevada Supreme Court in another
case:
Whether, under Nevada law, the liability of an insurer that has
breached its duty to defend, but has not acted in bad faith, is
capped at the policy limit plus any costs incurred by the insured
in mounting a defense, or is the insurer liable for all losses
consequential to the insurer’s breach?100
The Andrew parties urged the district court to certify the same question to the
Nevada Supreme Court, and the district court did precisely that in August
2017.101
3. The Nevada Supreme Court Decision in Andrew
The Nevada Supreme Court answered the district court’s certified
question by stating that “an insurer’s liability where it breaches its contractual
duty to defend is not capped at the policy limits plus the insured’s defense costs,
and instead, an insurer may be liable for the consequential damages caused by
its breach.”102 The court further concluded “that good-faith determinations are
irrelevant for determining damages upon breach of this duty.”103
In reaching these conclusions, the Andrew court explained that legal
principles applicable to contracts generally are applicable to insurance policies,
and that in a breach of contract case the injured party may recover expectancy
damages as outlined in section 347 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.104
Such damages include, in addition to benefit of the bargain damages, “any other
loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach,”105 minus
any cost or other loss that the injured party avoids by not having to perform its
contractual obligations.106
In the liability insurance context, an insurer owes its insured two
separate, express contractual duties: a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify.107
The duty to indemnify shields the insured against adverse judgments, “while the

100
Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00978-APG-PAL, 2017 WL 3484726, at *2 (D.
Nev. Aug. 14, 2017).
101
Id.
102
103
104
105
106
107

Century Sur. Co. v. Andrew, 432 P.3d 180, 182 (Nev. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 183.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
Id.
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duty to defend protects those insured from the action itself.”108 Indeed, an insured
pays its premium with the expectation that the insurer will honor its duty to
defend if and when the duty arises.109
In a case in which the duty to defend arises and the insurer breaches it,
“the insurer is at least liable for the insured’s reasonable costs in mounting a
defense in the underlying action.”110 But what about the insurer’s liability for the
full amount of any judgment that follows its breach of duty?
The Andrew court surveyed the majority and minority positions
regarding an insurer’s extracontractual liability for breaching the duty to
defend.111 After doing so, the court concluded that the minority view reflected
the better approach:112
Unlike the minority view, the majority view places an artificial
limit to the insurer’s liability within the policy limits for a breach
of its duty to defend. That limit is based on the insurer’s duty to
indemnify but “[a] duty to defend limited to and coextensive
with the duty to indemnify would be essentially meaningless;
insureds pay a premium for what is partly litigation insurance
designed to protect . . . the insured from the expense of
defending suits brought against him.” . . . Indeed, the insurance
policy limits “only the amount the insurer may have to pay in
the performance of the contract as compensation to a third
person for personal injuries caused by the insured; they do not
restrict the damages recoverable by the insured for a breach of
contract by the insurer.”
The obligation of the insurer to defend its insured is purely
contractual and a refusal to defend is considered a breach of
contract. Consistent with general contract principles, the
minority view provides that the insured may be entitled to
consequential damages resulting from the insurer’s breach of its
contractual duty to defend. Consequential damages “should be
such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising
naturally, or were reasonably contemplated by both parties at the
time they made the contract.” The determination of the insurer’s

108
109

Id.
Id. at 184.

110
Id. (citing Reyburn Lawn & Landscape Designers, Inc. v. Plaster Dev. Co., 255 P.3d 268,
278 (Nev. 2011)).
111
112

Id. at 184–85.
Id. at 185.

LIABILITY INSURER’S BREACH

2019]

229

liability depends on the unique facts of each case and is one that
is left to the jury’s determination.113
In summary, even in the absence of bad faith, an insurer that breaches its
duty to defend may be liable for the entire amount of a judgment that exceeds its
policy limits if the excess judgment is a consequence of its breach.114 An insurer
“refuses to defend at its own peril.”115
The Andrew court was careful to say that the entire amount of any
judgment is not “automatically a consequence” of the insurer’s breach of its duty
to defend.116 Rather, the insured must prove that the insurer’s breach of its duty
to defend caused an excess judgment.117 The insured must also “‘take all
reasonable means to protect himself and mitigate his damages.’”118
4. Analysis
Andrew is at best an incompletely reasoned decision. Most obviously,
the Nevada Supreme Court never focused on the principle that damages for
breach of contract are intended to restore the injured party to the position it would
have occupied had there been no breach; the injured party is not entitled to
improve its position through recovery for the breach.119 That was a significant
oversight, because Nevada law quite clearly embraces that principle.120
It is no answer to say that extracontractual liability is a fair measure of
consequential damages because Vasquez expected Century to defend him in the
underlying action. For one thing, Vasquez never expected a defense; he never
believed that Century owed him any obligations in connection with the

113

Id. at 185–86 (citations omitted).
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Id. at 186.
Id.

115
116
117

Id.
Id.

118
Id. (quoting Thomas v. W. World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977)).
119

See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Road & Highway Builders, L.L.C. v. N. Nev. Rebar, Inc., 284 P.3d 377, 392 (Nev.
2012) (“[I]n contracts cases, compensatory damages ‘are awarded to make the aggrieved party
whole and . . . should place the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the contract not
been breached.’” (quoting Hornwood v. Smith’s Food King No. 1, 807 P.2d 208, 211 (Nev.
1991))); Dalton Props., Inc. v. Jones, 683 P.2d 30, 31 (Nev. 1984) (“The object of compensatory
damages in an action for breach of contract is merely to place the injured party in the position that
he would have been in had the contract not been breached.”); Hennen v. Streeter, 31 P.2d 160, 163
(Nev. 1934) (“In case of [a] breach of contract, the injured party can only recover damages, and he
cannot be damaged in a greater sum than he would have received had there been no breach.”).
120
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accident.121 For another thing, the compensatory damages portion of the consent
judgment was over $12 million122 and there was no evidence before the court that
a vigorous defense would have reduced that amount.
If, in the abstract, Vasquez might have expected Century to settle the
underlying case when the plaintiffs demanded that it do so and thereby spare him
uninsured liability, that speculative and unfounded failure would have been
separate and apart from Century’s breach of its duty to defend. One would have
had nothing to do with the other. In fact, Vasquez did not believe that Century
should be liable for the consent judgment,123 and it is difficult to see how he could
have reasonably expected Century to settle for policy limits given the apparent
lack of coverage based on his many statements about being on a personal errand
at the time of the accident.124 Moreover, an insurer may decline to settle a lawsuit
against its insured within policy limits when the insurer does not owe coverage
for the related occurrence.125 In some jurisdictions, an insurer cannot be liable
for bad faith for failing to settle within policy limits when it has a reasonable
basis in fact or law for contesting coverage.126 All the evidence indicated that
Century did not owe coverage for the underlying occurrence, so it had no duty to
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See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text; Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., 134 F. Supp.
3d 1249, 1269 (D. Nev. 2015) (recounting that Vasquez initially did not want to sign the settlement
agreement that resolved the underlying lawsuit “because he maintained his position that he was
not at work at the time of the accident and therefore Century should not be liable”).
122
Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00978-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 5592889, at *2 (D.
Nev. Oct. 10, 2013).
123
124

Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1269 (D. Nev. 2015).
See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.

125
See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 375 F.3d 1097, 1101 (11th
Cir. 2004) (stating that “both South Carolina and Alabama law require insurance coverage as a
prerequisite for liability for a bad faith failure to settle a claim”); ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co., 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 181 (Ct. App. 2016) (“California recognizes ‘an implied duty
on the part of the insurer to accept reasonable settlement demands on [covered] claims within the
policy limits.’” (quoting Hamilton v. Md. Cas. Co., 41 P.3d 128, 132 (Cal. 2002))); Piedmont
Office Realty Tr., Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 771 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ga. 2015) (stating that “an
insurer cannot unreasonably refuse to settle a covered claim”); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Westfield Ins. Co., 962 N.E.2d 993, 1000 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“An insurer has a duty to act in good
faith in responding to settlement offers . . . but that duty only exists where there is coverage under
the policy.” (citation omitted)); Rocor Int’l, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 261
(Tex. 2002) (“Under the common law, an insurer generally has no obligation to settle a third-party
claim against its insured unless the claim is covered under the policy.” (citation omitted)).
126
See, e.g., Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 934 P.2d 65, 90 (Kan.
1997) (asserting that “an insurance company should not be required to settle a claim when there is
a good faith question as to whether there is coverage under its insurance policy” (quoting Snodgrass
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 1012, 1022 (Kan. 1991))); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Freyer, 312 P.3d 403, 418 (Mont. 2013) (noting that under Montana law as established in a
prior case, “an insurer does not act in bad faith in rejecting a settlement if it had a reasonable basis
in law or fact to contest the claim or the amount of the claim”).
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settle within policy limits; it certainly had a reasonable basis for disputing
coverage.
As for the Nevada Supreme Court’s reasoning that confining damages
for breach of the duty to defend to policy limits “places an artificial limit” on the
insurer’s liability by blending the duty to defend with the separate duty to
indemnify the insured,127 well, not exactly. First, “an insurer does not promise an
insured against all claims, whatever they might be.”128 An insurer has no duty to
defend a lawsuit against its insured if there is no basis on which the insurer may
be obligated to indemnify the insured.129 Phrased slightly differently, an insurer
has no duty to defend its insured when there is no possibility of coverage.130
Second, standard liability insurance policies provide that the insurer’s duty to
defend ends when the insurer has exhausted its policy limits through the payment
of judgments or settlements.131 In short, an insurer’s duty to defend and duty to
indemnify are not as distant from one another as the Andrew court would appear
to have believed. There is accordingly nothing incongruous about limiting an
insurer’s liability for breach of the duty to defend to the policy limits plus defense
costs.
Importantly, the Nevada Supreme Court did not hold that an insurer’s
simple breach of its duty to defend automatically exposes it to extracontractual
liability.132 Rather, the extent or scope of the insurer’s liability for breaching the
duty to defend requires case-specific inquiry.133 And remember, consequential
damages for an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend must have been foreseeable
to the insurer at the time of contracting134—not when the claim was made, the
insured was sued, or thereafter.135

127
Century Sur. Co. v. Andrew, 432 P.3d 180, 185 (Nev. 2018) (quoting Capitol Envtl. Servs.,
Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (E.D. Va. 2008)).
128
129

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 692.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.S.3d 468, 469 (App. Div. 2018).

130

Mau v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 388, 390–91 (8th Cir. 2018) (discussing North
Dakota law); All Green Elec., Inc. v. Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co., 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 454 (Ct. App. Div.
2018); Spencer v. Hartford Cas., 556 S.W.3d 679, 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
131
See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01
014 13), at 1 (2012) (“Our right and duty to defend ends when we have used up the applicable limit
of insurance in the payment of judgments or settlements . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
132
133
134

Andrew, 432 P.3d at 186.
Id. (citing Khan v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 757 S.E.2d 151, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)).

Bainbridge, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Co. of Conn., 159 P.3d 748, 756 (Colo. App. 2006);
Andrew, 432 P.3d at 186 (quoting Hornwood v. Smith’s Food King No. 1, 772 P.2d 1284, 1286
(Nev. 1989)).
135
See Nw. Pump & Equip. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Or. Ct. App.
1996) (en banc) (“Consequential damages are, by definition, those that the parties to a contract
reasonably contemplate at the time of execution, not at some later date.” (latter emphasis added)).
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III. THE MAJORITY RULE CAPPING LIABILITY AT THE POLICY LIMITS
Contrary to the outcome in Andrew, and as noted earlier, an insurer’s
mistaken breach of the duty to defend generally does not expose the company to
extracontractual liability.136 All the reasons that render the minority rule infirm

136
See, e.g., Nalder v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 824 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958)); Quorum Health Res., L.L.C.
v. Maverick Cty. Hosp. Dist., 308 F.3d 451, 468 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Texas law and stating
that damages for an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend are capped at policy limits); Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 177 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (Under Mississippi law, “if
the insurer has acted in good faith, it is not liable for any amount beyond the stated policy limit.
With respect to excess judgments, an insurer is not liable for the amount in excess of the policy
limit so long as the insurer has not acted in bad faith and has not wrongfully refused to settle the
claim within its policy limits.” (footnotes omitted)); Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan,
776 F. Supp. 2d 670, 702 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Under Illinois law, . . . ‘the mere failure to defend does
not, in the absence of bad faith, render the insurer liable for that amount of the judgment in excess
of the policy limits.’” (quoting Conway v. Country Cas. Ins. Co., 442 N.E.2d 245, 249 (Ill. 1982)));
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Grand Pointe, L.L.C., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1174 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (“Under
Tennessee law an insurer which breaches its duty to defend is liable for the amount of the policy
plus the reasonable costs incurred in providing a defense for its insured.”); Spence-Parker v. Md.
Ins. Grp., 937 F. Supp. 551, 557–58 (E.D. Va. 1996) (applying Virginia law and requiring bad faith
to impose extracontractual liability for breach of the duty to defend); Quihuis v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 334 P.3d 719, 730 (Ariz. 2014) (stating that if an insurer breaches its duty to defend
and “a court later finds coverage, the insurer must pay the damages awarded in the default judgment
(at least up to the policy limits) unless it can prove fraud or collusion”); Desert Mountain Props.
Ltd. P’ship v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 236 P.3d 421, 444 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (“An insurer’s
wrongful failure to indemnify or defend its insured ‘does not expose the insurance carrier to greater
liability than that contractually provided in the policy.’” (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Paynter, 593 P.2d 948, 954 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979))); Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins.
Co., 67 A.3d 961, 993 (Conn. 2013) (“If the insurer declines to provide its insured with a defense
and is subsequently found to have breached its duty to do so, it bears the consequences of its
decision, including the payment of any reasonable settlement agreed to by the plaintiff and the
insured, and the costs incurred effectuating the settlement up to the limits of the policy.”); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Horkheimer, 814 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(“Absent a showing of bad faith, a judgment cannot be entered against an insurer in excess of its
policy limits.”); Colonial Oil Indus. Inc. v. Underwriters Subscribing to Policy Nos. TO31504670
& TO31504671, 491 S.E.2d 337, 339 (Ga. 1997) (“[W]hen the insurer breaches the contract by
wrongfully refusing to provide a defense, the insured is entitled to receive only what it is owed
under the contract—the cost of defense. The breach of the duty to defend, however, should not
enlarge indemnity coverage beyond the parties’ contract.”); Johnson v. Westhoff Sand Co., 62 P.3d
685, 699 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (“[A]n insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend an action against
its insured is not liable for the amount of a judgment in excess of policy limits, absent a showing
by the insured that the excess judgment is traceable to the refusal to defend.”); Arceneaux v. Amstar
Corp., 66 So. 3d 438, 452 (La. 2011) (“The duty to defend is provided in the insurance contract;
therefore, its breach is determined by ordinary contract law principles and the insurer is liable for
the insured’s reasonable defense costs.”); Mesmer v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1064
(Md. 1999) (“[T]he damages for breach of the contractual duty to defend are limited to the
insured’s expenses, including attorney fees, in defending the underlying tort action, as well as the
insured’s expenses and attorney fees in a separate contract or declaratory judgment action if such
action is filed to establish that there exists a duty to defend.”); Engeldinger v. State Auto. & Cas.
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support courts’ adoption of the majority rule. The majority rule is not absolute,
however. Courts that generally cap an insurer’s liability for breach of the duty to
defend at policy limits plus the insured’s defense costs may permit
extracontractual liability where it is “traceable” to the insurer’s breach.137 Such
circumstances are rare, but they may exist where (a) the insurer’s breach of the
duty to defend is coupled with bad faith; (b) the insurer misleads the insured
about providing a defense; or (c) the insured is unable to defend itself.
A. Breach of the Duty to Defend Coupled with Bad Faith
An insurer may face extracontractual liability for breaching the duty to
defend where the breach is coupled with conduct by the insurer that qualifies as
third-party or first-party bad faith. In such cases, the insurer’s extracontractual
liability is held to be traceable to the insurer’s breach of the duty to defend.
1. Third-Party Bad Faith Requirement
Third-party bad faith is generally understood to refer to an insurer’s
unreasonable refusal to settle a lawsuit against its insured within the policy
limits.138 An insurer’s duty to make reasonable settlement decisions—and thus
to settle cases or claims against its insured within policy limits in some
circumstances—is independent from its duty to defend.139 Thus, an insurer that
breaches its duty to defend does not simultaneously breach its duty to settle; 140
that is, the insurer does not simultaneously commit third-party bad faith. The
seeming combination of the two breaches, however, may subject the insurer to

Underwriters, 236 N.W.2d 596, 602 (Minn. 1975) (reaffirming the rule announced in Mannheimer
Bros. v. Kansas Casualty & Surety Co., 184 N.W. 189, 191 (Minn. 1921)); Allen v. Bryers, 512
S.W.3d 17, 38 (Mo. 2016) (stating that an insurer that mistakenly breaches its duty to defend is
liable up to the policy limits plus attorney’s fees, expenses, and other damages (quoting Landie v.
Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)); Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 188 A.2d 320, 322 (Pa. 1963) (“[T]he amount of [the] recovery for breach of the [duty to
defend] is the cost of hiring substitute counsel and other costs of the defense, and not the judgment
obtained against the insured.”); Waite v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 467 P.2d 847, 851 (Wash. 1970)
(en banc) (“[W]here an insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, it will be required to pay the judgment
or settlement to the extent of its policy limits and also to reimburse the insured for his costs
reasonably incurred in defense of the action.”).
137

Johnson, 62 P.3d at 699.
See Douglas R. Richmond, Defining and Confining Institutional Bad Faith in Insurance, 46
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 6 (2010) (“In the liability insurance context, most bad faith claims
arise out of an insurer’s failure to settle a covered claim or suit against its insured within its policy
limits despite the opportunity to do so, followed by a judgment against the insured exceeding those
limits.” (footnote omitted)).
138

139
140

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 744.
Id.
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extracontractual liability.141 The requirement of bad faith for extracontractual
liability for breach of the duty to defend and the interplay between the two
offenses is illustrated by two Missouri Supreme Court cases: Columbia Casualty
Co. v. HIAR Holdings, L.L.C.,142 and Allen v. Bryers.143
In Columbia Casualty, a class of plaintiffs sued HIAR Holdings under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) after a marketing company
that worked for HIAR sent around 12,500 unsolicited fax advertisements (better
known as junk faxes) to recipients in two area codes.144 HIAR tendered defense
of the suit to Columbia Casualty, which in December 2002 declined to defend
HIAR based on a lack of coverage.145 Columbia Casualty declined to defend
HIAR for a second time in October 2003.146
In March 2005, the plaintiffs offered to settle with HIAR for an amount
within its insurance policy limits, which were $1 million per occurrence and $2
million in the aggregate.147 HIAR sent the settlement offer to Columbia Casualty,
which again denied coverage and declined to defend HIAR.148 Columbia
Casualty also rejected the plaintiffs’ settlement offer and refused to join in
settlement negotiations.149 Consequently, HIAR defended the case at its own
expense until it settled for $5 million in January 2007.150 In April 2007, the trial
court approved the settlement, entered a judgment for the class, and approved
HIAR’s assignment to the class of its claims against Columbia Casualty and any
other insurer potentially on the risk.151
The class sought to collect the $5 million judgment plus post-judgment
interest through a garnishment action against Columbia Casualty.152 In response,
Columbia Casualty filed a declaratory judgment (“DJ”) action to determine its
duties to defend and indemnify HIAR.153 The garnishment action was stayed
pending the outcome of the DJ action.154

In fact, it is the insurer’s allegedly unreasonable failure to settle within policy limits that
subjects it to extracontractual liability; the insurer’s breach of the duty to defend is simply a
precipitating event.
142
411 S.W.3d 258 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).
141

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

512 S.W.3d 17 (Mo. 2016).
Columbia Cas., 411 S.W.3d at 261–62.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 262 & n.5.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
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In the DJ action, the trial court determined that Columbia Casualty was
obligated to defend HIAR in the class action because the class’s TCPA claims
were covered as “advertising injury” and because they sought “property
damage.”155 The trial court also held that Columbia Casualty was liable for the
full $5 million settlement amount, plus post-judgment interest.156 The trial court
reasoned that “an insurer that wrongly refuses to defend cannot thereafter litigate
the reasonableness of an indemnification amount and becomes liable for the
entire underlying judgment as damages flowing from its breach of its duty to
defend.”157 Columbia Casualty appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.
The Columbia Casualty court sided with the class right out of the gate,
stating that an “insurer that wrongly refuses to defend is liable for the underlying
judgment as damages flowing from its breach of its duty to defend.”158 Columbia
Casualty contended that it could not be liable for the full amount of the settlement
because “only a ‘bad faith’ claim could result in the award of extra-contractual
damages, and . . . no ‘bad faith’ allegation was presented” here.159 The court was
not persuaded.160 As it had already noted, “Columbia’s wrongful refusal to
defend HIAR put it in a position to indemnify HIAR for all damages flowing
from its breach of the duty to defend.”161 The class further insisted that it had
sufficiently alleged that Columbia Casualty had acted in bad faith by refusing to
defend HIAR and by refusing to participate in settlement negotiations.162 As the
class saw matters, Columbia Casualty’s extracontractual liability was merely a
known consequence of its breach of its duty to defend HIAR and its failure to
settle within its policy limits.163
According to the court, because Columbia Casualty wrongly “denied
coverage and even a defense under a reservation of rights, and also refused to
engage in settlement negotiations,” it could not avoid liability for the full amount
of the judgment.164 After considering two additional issues, the Columbia
Casualty court affirmed the trial court judgment in favor of the class.165
It is difficult to understand how Columbia Casualty’s breach of the duty
to defend could have caused the excess judgment against HIAR since HIAR

155
156

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.

157
Id. (citing Schmitz v. Great Am. Assurance Co., 337 S.W.3d 700, 708–09 (Mo. 2011) (en
banc)).
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 265 (citing Schmitz, 337 S.W.3d at 708–09).
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. (citing Schmitz, 337 S.W.3d at 710).
Id.
Id. at 273–74 (citing Shobe v. Kelly, 279 S.W.3d 203, 209–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)).
Id. at 274 (citing Shobe, 279 S.W.3d at 209–11).
Id.
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defended the case at its own expense for five years thereafter. In fact, Columbia
Casualty’s breach of its duty to defend did not cause the excess judgment. The
$5 million consent judgment was the product of Columbia Casualty’s failure to
settle the class action for policy limits when it had the opportunity to do so.
Columbia Casualty’s bad faith refusal to settle would be a distinguishing factor
three years later in Allen v. Bryers.166
Allen arose out of a personal injury action. John Frank, who owned the
Sheridan Apartments in Kansas City, Missouri, had a $1 million CGL policy
with Atain Specialty Insurance Co. (“Atain”).167 In June 2012, Wayne Bryers,
who was the property and security manager at the apartments, shot Franklin
Allen while ejecting him from the premises.168 Allen was paralyzed as a result.169
In August 2012, Allen’s lawyer wrote Frank to inform him that Allen
intended to assert a negligence claim against Bryers.170 Allen’s lawyer
subsequently sent a similar letter to Atain, advising it of the severity of Allen’s
injury and Allen’s forthcoming claims against Frank and Bryers.171
In September 2012, Atain agreed to defend Bryers under a reservation
of rights.172 In its reservation of rights letter, Atain informed Bryers that the
policy’s bodily injury provision and exclusions for expected or intended injuries,
employment-related practices, and assault and battery likely barred coverage for
Allen’s claim.173 Atain ended the reservation of rights letter by stating that it
“denie[d] any and all coverage under the policy in connection with [Allen’s]
claim . . . and furthermore denie[d] that it ha[d] any legal obligation to indemnify
[Bryers] in the event a lawsuit [was] filed and a judgment [was] entered against
[Bryers].”174
With its reservation of rights in place, Atain filed a DJ action in federal
court in which it alleged that its policy did not cover Bryers because of its assault
and battery and expected or intended injury exclusions and because there was no
“occurrence.”175 Shortly thereafter, Allen demanded that Atain settle his claim
against Bryers for the $1 million policy limit.176 Atain rejected Allen’s settlement
demand.177 Allen thus prepared to reach a so-called section 537.065 agreement

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

512 S.W.3d 17 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Atain’s reservation of rights letter).
Id. (quoting Atain’s DJ filing).
Id.
Id. at 24–25.
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with Bryers whereby Allen would limit the collection of any judgment he might
obtain against Bryers to insurance proceeds.178
Allen subsequently sued Bryers for negligence and included in his
petition various allegations that were intended to circumvent Atain’s coverage
defenses.179 Atain hired defense counsel for Bryers, who filed an answer on his
behalf.180 Bryers then rejected Atain’s reservation of rights defense, and the
defense lawyers Atain hired for Bryers withdrew from the case.181 On the heels
of those events, Bryers withdrew his answer and consented to the entry of
judgment against him consistent with his section 537.065 agreement with
Allen.182
The case proceeded to a bench trial at which Allen won a $16 million
judgment.183 The trial court made several factual findings that established
coverage for Allen’s injuries under the Atain policy.184 After the judgment
became final, Allen filed a garnishment action against Atain to collect the
judgment.185 Ultimately, the garnishment court awarded Allen summary
judgment and ordered Atain to pay him $16 million, reasoning that
“‘extra-contractual’ damages were appropriate because [Atain] was suffering the
consequences of its breach of its duty to defend and its failure to settle within the
policy limit.”186 Atain appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which
transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court.187
The Missouri Supreme Court explained that when Bryers rejected
Atain’s defense under a reservation of rights, Atain had three options:
(1) represent Bryers without a reservation of rights; (2) withdraw from his
defense altogether; or (3) file a DJ action to determine coverage.188 Here, Atain
had filed a DJ action long before Bryers rejected its defense under a reservation
of rights.189 Under Missouri law:

178

See id. at 24–25, 25 n.4 (discussing a section 537.065 agreement).

179

See id. at 25 (reciting the allegations in Allen’s petition).
Id.

180

Id. “It is well-settled [under Missouri law] that an insured has the right to reject a reservation
of rights defense.” Id. at 32 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d 523,
527 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)).
182
Id. at 25.
181

183
184
185
186
187

Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.

Id. at 23 & n.2.
Id. at 32 (quoting Kinnaman-Carson v. Westport Ins. Corp., 283 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Mo.
2009) (en banc)).
189
Id.
188
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An insurer’s decision to file a declaratory judgment action
instead of foregoing its reservation of rights defense is a risky
one. By filing a declaratory judgment action, the insurer’s
decision is treated as a refusal to defend, and, if determined to
be “unjustified, the insurer is treated as if it waived any control
of the defense of the underlying tort action.” In this case, [Atain]
wrongfully refused to defend Bryers. . . . Instead of defending
Bryers, [Atain] asserted a full reservation of rights, denied
coverage, and filed a declaratory judgment action in federal
district court before Allen’s petition was filed.
Once an insurer unjustifiably refuses to defend or provide
coverage, the insured may enter into an agreement with the
plaintiff to limit his or her liability to the insurance policy
limits.190
Atain disputed its liability for the $16 million judgment.191 Again, the
garnishment court held that because Atain wrongly refused to defend Bryers, it
had to indemnify him in connection with the section 537.065 agreement.192 The
garnishment court further rejected Atain’s argument that it could not be liable for
damages in excess of its policy limit in the absence of bad faith.193 In so deciding,
the garnishment court cited Columbia Casualty for the proposition that Atain had
to suffer the consequences of breaching its duty to defend and failing to settle for
policy limits.194 Atain argued that the garnishment court misinterpreted
Columbia Casualty.195 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with Atain.196
The Allen court explained that, in Columbia Casualty, the court hearing
the DJ action “explicitly found [that] the insurer engaged in bad faith when it
both refused to defend and to settle the claim.”197 Columbia Casualty did not
appeal that determination.198 Thus, because it was held to have “acted in bad faith
for refusing both to defend and to settle, [Columbia Casualty] was liable for the

190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 38.
Id.

Id.
Id. According to the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Columbia Casualty, the trial
court hearing the DJ action “found that Columbia acted unreasonably and in bad faith in handling
HIAR’s claim for coverage in the TCPA action initiated by the class.” Columbia Cas. Co. v. HIAR
Holding, L.L.C., 411 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). It is not clear from that summary of
the trial court’s findings how Columbia Casualty acted in bad faith in failing to defend HIAR as
the Allen court recited.
198
Allen, 512 S.W.3d at 38.
197
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entire amount of the judgment beyond the policy limits.”199 Here, although the
garnishment court found that Atain had breached its duty to defend and refused
to settle within policy limits, “it made no finding of bad faith.”200 The
garnishment court therefore “exceeded its authority in awarding Allen the full
amount of the underlying tort judgment because Allen was only entitled to the
$1 million policy limits” under longstanding Missouri caselaw.201 “Accordingly,
the garnishment court erred in entering judgment in excess of the $1 million
policy limit.”202
Again, the contrasting holdings in Columbia Casualty and Allen pivoted
on the finding of bad faith in the former and the lack of a similar finding in the
latter. Absent a finding of bad faith in Allen, there was no basis to award
extracontractual damages for Atain’s breach of its duty to defend Bryers.
2. An Insurer’s First-Party Bad Faith May Result in Extracontractual
Liability for Breaching the Duty to Defend
Although liability insurance is third-party insurance and an insurer’s
refusal to settle within policy limits may support third-party bad faith allegations,
an insured’s right to a defense is sometimes characterized as a first-party
benefit.203 Thus, in a state that recognizes a first-party bad faith cause of action,204
an insurer may face extracontractual liability if it refuses to defend an insured in
bad faith or withdraws a defense in bad faith.205 An insurer may be liable for bad
faith in refusing to defend an insured or in withdrawing a defense already offered
when it does so (a) without a reasonable basis for its actions and (b) with
knowledge of its duty to defend or in reckless disregard of whether it had a duty

199

Id.

200

Id.
Id. at 39 (referring to Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)).

201
202

Id.
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM T. BARKER & RONALD D. KENT, NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE BAD
FAITH LITIGATION § 3:08[3] (2d ed. 2019) (describing an insured’s right to a defense as a first-party
benefit).
203

204
Liability for first-party bad faith generally requires the insured to prove that (1) the insurer
had no reasonable basis for denying the claim and (2) the insurer knew that there was no reasonable
basis for denying the claim or acted with reckless disregard for the existence of such a basis. Hayes
v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 908 F.3d 370, 374 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Bailey v. Farmers Union
Coop. Ins. Co., 498 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992)) (applying Nebraska law); De Stefano
v. Apts. Downtown, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 155, 188 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Kiner v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
463 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1990)); Rancosky v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 170 A.3d 364, 365, 376 (Pa.
2017) (discussing the standard for statutory bad faith in Pennsylvania). “[T]he reasonableness of
an insurer’s decision to deny or delay benefits to its insured must be evaluated based on the
information that was before the insurer at the time it made its coverage decision.” Schultz v.
GEICO Cas. Co., 429 P.3d 844, 848–49 (Colo. 2018).
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to defend.206 Furthermore, because a liability insurer that agrees to defend its
insured must perform its duty to defend with due care,207 an insurer that conducts
the defense unreasonably and with knowledge that it is conducting the defense
unreasonably or with reckless disregard of its defense obligations may face
extracontractual liability.208 Finally, as the conjunction “and” clearly signals, a
plaintiff must prove both (a) and (b) to establish an insurer’s bad faith in refusing
to defend, or in withdrawing or mishandling a defense.
In Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pacific Insurance
209
Co.,
for example, Reliance Insurance Co. withdrew its defense of the
defendant real estate developers four months before trial.210 Reliance did so
based on a coverage opinion from outside counsel.211 Although Reliance had
previously reserved its rights to deny coverage for the lawsuit, it never filed a DJ
action to determine its obligations.212 The developers did not retain substitute
counsel to defend the suit, and the plaintiffs obtained a $339,000 default
judgment against them.213 The developers were forced to seek bankruptcy
protection as a result of the default judgment, and the damage to their credit
impaired their ability to do business going forward.214 A jury found that Reliance
acted in bad faith in withdrawing its defense, and while Reliance appealed the
verdict on a variety of grounds, it did not dispute the jury’s finding that it
wrongfully withdrew the developers’ defense.215 “Reliance [was] therefore liable
to the developers for the amount of the judgment, and all other damages
consequential to it.”216
Similarly, in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Acel Delivery Service, Inc.,217 the
insurer, which had been defending the insured for over one and a half years,

See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 49 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“Liability for
Insurance Bad Faith”); see also Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales & Mktg., Inc., 93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 364, 387 (Ct. App. 2000) (“A breach of the duty to defend in itself constitutes only a
breach of contract . . . but it may also violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing where it
involves unreasonable conduct or an action taken without proper cause.” (citations omitted)).
207
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 716.
206

208
It is important to understand that in such circumstances the insurer is not being held
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insured. Rather, the insurer is being held liable for its own mishandling of the defense.
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withdrew its defense less than one month before trial.218 In fact, Pacific
Indemnity should have been able to make an informed decision about its defense
and indemnity obligations to the insured at the outset of the litigation or
reasonably soon thereafter had it adequately investigated relevant events.219
Although the insured retained replacement counsel to handle the trial, the Pacific
Indemnity court concluded that the insurer’s withdrawal of the defense
prejudiced the insured because it “deprived the [insured] of the opportunity to
present a more forceful defense.”220 The court affirmed the district court’s
determination that the insurer was estopped to deny coverage for the accident
underlying the litigation.221 A corresponding result was reached in Beckwith
Machinery Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,222 where the insurer abruptly
withdrew its defense after 13 months and, in the process, effectively denied the
insured the opportunity to investigate the plaintiff’s claims.223 The Beckwith
court branded Travelers’s conduct “obdurate and contumacious” and held that
Travelers had waived and was estopped from asserting any coverage defenses.224
Delatorre v. Safeway Insurance Co.225 is an interesting case involving
an insurer’s unreasonable conduct of the insured’s defense. Bonifacio Delatorre
was a passenger in a car driven by Ruben Delatorre when they were involved in
an accident with another vehicle.226 Bonifacio and the two occupants of the other
vehicle all sued Ruben, who was insured under a personal auto policy with
Safeway Insurance with liability limits of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per
accident.227 Bonifacio made a policy limits settlement demand on Safeway,
which the insurer declined.228 Safeway did, however, agree to defend Ruben in
the lawsuits against him under a reservation of rights.229 Safeway hired lawyer
I.R. Strizak to defend Ruben in Bonifacio’s lawsuit.230
Strizak filed an entry of appearance and answer on Ruben’s behalf in
December 1992 but did nothing more to defend Ruben.231 Safeway paid no fees
to Strizak for defending Ruben; for that matter, Strizak did not even submit any
218
219
220
221
222
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224
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invoices to Safeway in connection with Ruben’s representation.232 When Strizak
did not respond to discovery, Bonifacio obtained a default judgment against
Ruben in December 1994.233 Bonifacio’s lawyer sent a copy of the default order
to Safeway, which forwarded it to Strizak.234 This was the only written
communication that Safeway had or attempted with Strizak in the two years since
it had retained him to defend Ruben.235 Strizak never responded.236 In November
1995, the court held a “prove-up hearing” on the default judgment and awarded
Bonifacio $250,000.237 Ruben then assigned his rights against Safeway to
Bonifacio, who sued Safeway for breach of contract, vexatious and unreasonable
delay in settling his claim, and punitive damages.238 In particular, Bonifacio
alleged that Safeway breached its duty to defend “when it ignored notice that
Strizak was not providing Ruben with a meaningful defense.”239 Bonifacio
further alleged that because of Safeway’s inadequate defense, Ruben became
subject to the $250,000 default judgment.240
Bonifacio prevailed at summary judgment on his claim for breach of the
duty to defend.241 He subsequently filed a supplemental summary judgment
motion on the issue of damages, which Safeway opposed in part on the basis that
its liability for breach of contract was capped at the policy limits.242 Bonifacio
won that motion, too, and the trial entered a $250,000 judgment plus costs in his
favor.243 Safeway promptly appealed.
The case presented a unique issue on appeal: “whether an insurer that
has retained counsel to defend its insured, may, in certain limited circumstances,
still be found to have breached its duty to defend.”244 The court reasoned that the
question required an affirmative answer because otherwise an insurer could
“escape its legal obligation to provide good faith representation and instead
freely abandon its insured to an attorney who either is unwilling or unable to
undertake the defense, or who, as in this case, inexplicably desert[ed] the
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client.”245 Persuaded by an analogous Seventh Circuit case,246 the court decided
“that retaining an attorney, standing alone, does not discharge an insurer’s duty
to defend.”247 In making this determination, the Delatorre court rejected
Safeway’s opposing argument:
[Safeway] maintains that it did more than merely retain an
attorney. Specifically, when it learned that its insured had been
subject to an order of default, it sent the order to Strizak. The
circuit court found this limited action was insufficient to satisfy
[Safeway’s] duty to defend, and we agree. Significantly, we do
not question the means [Safeway] used to contact Strizak, but
rather the fact that there is no evidence that [it] made any further
effort to obtain an explanation from Strizak as to why the default
was entered, or whether he sought to have it vacated. Indeed,
[Safeway] admit[ted] that with the exception of the letter
forwarding the notice of default, it had no written
communication with Strizak between December 3, 1992, when
Strizak accepted responsibility for Ruben’s defense, until over
three years after entry of the default judgment against Ruben.248
In summary, Safeway’s “nominal, passive, and one-way communication” with
Strizak breached its duty to defend Ruben.249
With the question of breach decided, the court turned to damages.250
Bonifacio had established in the trial court that both the original default and the
resulting default judgment resulted entirely from Safeway’s breach of its duty to
defend, and Safeway offered no evidence to the contrary.251 On that record, the
court reasoned that the default judgment—including the portion in excess of the
policy limits—flowed directly from Safeway’s breach of its duty to defend.252 In
other words, Safeway’s breach of its duty to defend proximately caused the
default judgment.253 As the court noted, “[t]his situation could have been averted
altogether had [Safeway] seen to it that its insured was actually defended as
contractually required.”254
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The Delatorre court affirmed the trial court judgment for Bonifacio on
his breach of contract and related excess liability claims.255 The court did,
however, “expressly limit [its] decision on the suitability of the default
judgment . . . as the measure of damages to the precise facts of this case, and
[did] not decide its applicability to future cases.”256
Delatorre is a case with some holes. Most notably, while Safeway’s
failure to direct Ruben’s defense and monitor Strizak’s work in the process may
have proximately caused the default and default judgment, it did not necessarily
affect the amount of the default judgment. In other words, if Bonifacio’s case
really was worth $250,000, as he apparently proved to the trial court’s
satisfaction, it is speculative to think that Safeway’s proper defense of Ruben
would have produced a lower judgment. After all, Bonifacio was a passenger in
Ruben’s car—it was not as though a jury might find him comparatively at fault
for the accident. Unfortunately for Safeway, it appears from the opinion that it
defended itself in the trial court no more effectively than it defended Ruben.
Devich v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.257 is a case in which the
court rejected the plaintiffs’ bad faith claim. There, Mike Devich was injured
while operating an aerial work platform designed and manufactured by Maverick
Mobile Equipment.258 At the time of Devich’s injury, Maverick was insured
under a Commercial Union policy with applicable liability limits of $500,000.259
Devich and his wife sued Maverick on several theories, and Commercial Union
promptly opened a claim file.260 After interviewing Maverick’s president, Robert
Bajek, Commercial Union denied coverage for the Devichs’ lawsuit based on the
products-completed operations hazard exclusion in its policy.261 Commercial
Union also concluded that it had no duty to defend Maverick and advised
Maverick to retain its own lawyer.262 Maverick’s lawyer responded by telling
Commercial Union that Maverick intended to allow the Devichs to take a default
judgment against it.263 Commercial Union again denied coverage and refused to
defend Maverick.264
The Devichs took a default judgment against Maverick.265 A subsequent
bench trial to liquidate the plaintiffs’ damages resulted in a judgment of just over
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$859,000.266 Maverick assigned the Devichs its rights under the Commercial
Union policy, and the Devichs sued Commercial Union to collect the full amount
of the judgment.267
The Devich court held that the Devichs’ negligent failure to warn claim
against Maverick was outside the scope of the products-completed operations
hazard exclusion, meaning that Commercial Union had breached its duty to
defend Maverick.268 The question then became the amount of damages
recoverable for the breach.269 Commercial Union could “be required to
indemnify beyond the limits of the policy only if its decision not to defend was
made in bad faith,” which, under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiffs had to prove
by clear and convincing evidence.270 This they could not do. As the court
explained:
We hold that Commercial Union did not act in bad faith in
denying a defense to Maverick. . . . [T]he facts establish that the
carrier acted in good faith based upon a firm belief that the
claims were not covered. Immediately after receiving notice of
the claim from Maverick, defendant undertook an investigation
of the claim, which included interviewing Bajek, to determine
the underlying facts relevant to the coverage issue. Once it
determined that the injuries to Mike Devich were caused by
defects in the aerial platform, [Commercial Union] denied
coverage on the basis that the claim fell within the productscompleted operations hazard exclusion. Although we have
determined that this was a faulty basis for coverage denial, it
was not unreasonable for Commercial Union to rely on the
exclusion in view of the status of the law in Pennsylvania with
respect to the scope of the exclusion.271
Case law in other states also supported Commercial Union’s policy
interpretation.272
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The Devich court held that under the circumstances, Commercial
Union’s decision not to defend Maverick was not an act of bad faith.273 Because
Commercial Union did not commit bad faith, its liability was capped at its policy
limits.274 The court therefore awarded the Devichs $500,000 rather than the full
amount of their default judgment.275
3. Summary
Extracontractual liability for an insurer’s bad faith in connection with its
breach of the duty to defend should be limited to situations in which (a) the
insurer knowingly acts unreasonably in denying a defense,276 withdrawing a
defense,277 or conducting the defense of the insured; and (b) the insurer’s
unreasonable conduct directly results in excess liability. Again, as the
conjunction “and” clearly indicates, a plaintiff must prove both (a) and (b) to
establish an insurer’s bad faith. This approach tracks first-party bad faith law in
other contexts. An insurer that unreasonably fails to settle a case or claim within
policy limits after breaching its duty to defend should face extracontractual
liability only for breaching its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in
failing to settle. There is no need to try to link extracontractual liability for a
missed settlement opportunity to the insurer’s breach of its duty to defend. As
noted earlier, an insurer’s duty to settle is independent from its duty to defend.278
A breach of one duty does not necessarily have anything to do with a breach of
the other. Extracontractual liability for an insurer’s unreasonable failure to settle
within policy limits provides an insured with a sufficient remedy for the insurer’s
bad faith.
B. Misleading the Insured About Providing a Defense May Result in
Extracontractual Liability
Beyond bad faith, an insurance company may be responsible for the full
amount of a default judgment if the company either through misrepresentations
or inaction leads an insured to believe that the company will provide a defense,
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the insured relies on the insurer to defend it and thus does not employ counsel on
its own, and the insurer does not defend the insured as expected.279 In that
instance, the full amount of the default judgment—including any amounts in
excess of the insurer’s policy limits—may be held to represent the insured’s
consequential damages attributable to the insurer’s breach of the duty to
defend.280 If the insured instead settles with the plaintiff following the insurer’s
breach, the insurer may still challenge the settlement or the amount thereof on
reasonableness grounds or as being procured through bad faith, fraud, or
collusion.281
Rushforth Construction Co. v. Wesco Insurance Co.282 is a recent case in
which the insurer refused to communicate its willingness to defend the insured
until it was too late.283 In that case, the court determined that the insurer breached
its duty to defend and was guilty of bad faith in delaying its decision to defend
the insured under a reservation of rights, but did not impose tort liability for bad
faith because the issue of resulting harm to the insured was not presented.284
Rushforth Construction (“Rushforth”) was the general contractor on a
construction project known as the Lake Hills Village Project.285 It also was an
additional insured on an insurance policy issued to one of its subcontractors by
Wesco Insurance Co.286 In October 2015, Lake Hills sued Rushforth for defective
construction.287 Lake Hills filed an amended complaint in June 2016.288
On July 1, 2016, Rushforth demanded that Wesco defend and indemnify
it in connection with the Lake Hills lawsuit.289 Wesco and its third-party claim
administer investigated the matter.290 The Wesco adjuster assigned to the claim
drafted a reservation of rights (“ROR”) letter on or around September 1, 2016,

279

Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., v. Canal Ins. Co., 177 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 1
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and had it in shape for approval and issuance about three weeks later.291
Inexplicably, however, Wesco did not issue the ROR letter.292 Nor did Wesco
apparently take any position on coverage because, over the next ten months,
Rushforth sent Wesco four letters asking it to announce a coverage position.293
Upon receipt of these letters, Wesco’s adjuster sought internal approval to issue
the ROR letter, but Wesco neither issued the ROR letter nor replied to
Rushforth’s requests for a coverage position.294
In July 2017, Rushforth sued Wesco on multiple theories, including
breach of contract and bad faith.295 Once Rushforth sued it, Wesco sent Rushforth
the ROR letter and agreed to defend Rushforth in the Lake Hills action under the
terms outlined in the letter.296 Rushforth rejected Wesco’s offer of defense.297
In its lawsuit against Wesco, Rushforth moved for partial summary
judgment on Wesco’s breach of its duty to defend and its liability for bad faith.298
Wesco cross-moved for summary judgment.299 Construing all facts in Wesco’s
favor, the Rushforth court quickly concluded that Wesco breached its duty to
defend Rushforth.300 As the court reasoned:
An insurer’s duty to defend is triggered by the filing of a covered
complaint. This duty includes the obligation to provide a
“prompt and proper defense.” An insurer may breach its duty to
defend by failing to respond to an insured’s tender in a
reasonably timely manner. An offer to defend after an initial
denial does not erase an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend.
The Court finds no reason to treat a constructive denial through
failure to respond to Plaintiff’s tender any differently. . . .
Wesco owed Plaintiff a duty to defend no later than June 20,
2016, when the amended complaint was filed in the underlying
action. Wesco did not offer to defend Plaintiff until July 26,
2017—over a year later and after Plaintiff brought suit. Wesco
owed and breached its duty to defend Plaintiff.301
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With respect to Rushforth’s bad faith claim, the court observed that an
insurer is guilty of bad faith “if its actions are ‘unreasonable, frivolous, or
unfounded.’”302 Liability for bad faith under Washington law does not require
intentional misrepresentation or fraud by the insurer.303 An insurer’s “[f]ailure to
promptly respond to a demand for coverage can constitute an unreasonable denial
of benefits, even if the insurer eventually offers coverage.”304
Here, “reasonable minds could not differ that Wesco’s delay was
frivolous and unfounded.”305 At best, the record reflected Wesco’s “unfounded
lack of attention to its insureds’ claims.”306 Wesco could offer no facts to support
a reasonable basis for its delay in responding to Rushforth’s request for a defense
and indemnity that would allow it to survive summary judgment.307 But, while
the Rushforth court found that Wesco was guilty of bad faith as a matter of law,
it declined to find that Wesco had committed the tort of bad faith.308 “Harm is an
essential element of a suit for bad faith handling of an insurance claim,”309 and
Wesco’s duty to indemnify Rushforth and Rushforth’s alleged harm were both
disputed and were not addressed in the parties’ cross-motions.310
Assuming Rushforth is litigated to conclusion, there currently appears to
be no basis for extracontractual liability against Wesco. Rushforth defended the
Lake Hills case rather than defaulting or settling via a consent judgment.311 At
this point, Rushforth’s damages attributable to Wesco’s breach of its duty to
defend appear to be limited to its reasonable defense costs.
The lesson for insurers is obvious: if coverage is doubtful, timely offer
to defend the insured under a clearly-worded reservation of rights. If there is no
possibility of coverage, disclaim a duty to defend or indemnify the insured within
a reasonable time after first being asked to provide a defense. Either step should
prevent liability based on allegedly misleading conduct or inaction.
C. The Insured Is Unable to Defend Itself
Another possible exception to the general rule that an insurer’s breach
of its duty to defend should not result in extracontractual liability may be found
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where the insured is unable to afford a lawyer and suffers a default judgment that
exceeds policy limits as a result.312 It is not apparent, however, why
extracontractual liability is appropriate in this instance. As noted earlier,
damages for breach of contract are intended to restore the injured party to the
position it would have enjoyed had the breaching party fulfilled its obligations.313
The injured party is not entitled to be placed in a better position than it would
have occupied had there been no breach of contract.314 Holding an insurer liable
for the full amount of an excess judgment in this situation violates those core
contract law principles.
If an insurer were to face extracontractual liability in this situation, it
would have to be because it was foreseeable to the insurer at the time of
contracting that the insured would be financially unable to defend itself following
a breach of the duty to defend by the insurer.315 This is because the entire amount
of the default judgment must be characterized as a type of consequential damage,
and liability for consequential damages requires that the insured’s inability to
defend itself and resulting default be foreseeable at the time of contracting.316
The determination of such foreseeability necessarily requires case- and
fact-specific inquiry.317
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An insurer should not face extracontractual liability where the insured
can afford to hire its own defense counsel but chooses not to do so.318 A default
in that instance is the product of the insured’s choice rather than the insurer’s
breach.
IV. CONCLUSION
With rare exception, an insurer’s simple breach of the duty to defend
should not expose it to extracontractual liability; rather, the insurer’s liability
should be capped at the policy limits plus the insured’s defense costs, if any.
Extracontractual liability for breach of the duty to defend should require an act
of bad faith by the insurer or some other extraordinary circumstance, such as the
insurer misleading the insured about the provision of a defense. Indeed, that is
the majority rule among those courts that have considered the issue. The minority
approach, which holds that an insurer’s mistaken breach of its duty to defend
may expose it to extracontractual liability, is seriously flawed. The Nevada
Supreme Court’s recent adoption of the minority approach in its highlypublicized decision in Century Surety Co. v. Andrew,319 while interesting, is but
one more example of a fine court erring in a case involving this important aspect
of insurance law.
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